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Following their EU15 counterparts, the banking systems of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries underwent extensive reform since the 1990s. In this paper we 
estimate the degree of bank market power during the periods of financial reform in each 
European country, and subsequently we analyze the political and institutional sources of 
bank competition distinguishing between the EU15 and CEE subgroups. A linear pattern 
in the relationship between bank competition and institutional strength is demonstrated 
for the EU15 group of countries, while for the CEEs this pattern is non-linear. Therefore, 
we suggest that relatively underdeveloped banking systems, in less advanced politico-
institutional milieus, overall fail to benefit from reforms in their early stages. As a policy 
implication the results imply that a certain level of institutional maturity, combined with 
openness to foreign investors, is a precondition for reforms aiming at enhancing 
competition and efficiency of banking markets.  
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This article focuses on the effect of the institutional environment on bank 
competition (market power) in 15 older European Union (EU15) countries as compared 
to 14 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, during financial reform periods. 
The comparative political economy debate has devoted particular attention to the 
financial and banking system, and its relationship with state institutions (e.g. Zysman, 
1983; Pagoulatos, 2003; Verdier, 2003). However, the political and institutional forces 
that shape competition in the banking sector have not been given special consideration. 
We find strong evidence that the institutional conditions prevailing in the countries 
examined during the reform period play a critical role in shaping bank competition.  
Since their transition to democracy and the market economy, CEE economies 
have been steadily gravitating towards Western Europe, in terms of markets and 
institutions. Their process of Europeanization, driven by the successive objectives of EU 
and EMU accession, generated expectations of convergence (Dyson, 2006). What are the 
limits of convergence? Different institutional endowments, departure points and 
transition paths engendered dissimilarity of outcomes, enriching the “varieties of 
capitalism” debate (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2004) with a new set of empirical 
observations. Some have suggested that CEEs form a distinctive cluster or variety of 
capitalist democracy, with much in common with the EU15 cohesion group 
(McMenamin, 2004). 
Both in the EU15 and the CEEs the banking sector led structural reform with a 
uniform trend towards privatization and sectoral liberalization. Privatization and 
liberalization/deregulation were usually followed by policies of re-regulation, aimed at 
systemic safety and consumer protection (Majone, 1996). European banking reform 
relied extensively on EC competition policy and the pursuit of a single European market. 
Since the early to middle 1980s, one EC/EU country after another proceeded to stimulate 
internal banking competition (Bröker, 1989) and liberalize the banking sector. Beginning 
in the early 1990s, with a few years-time lag, the CEE countries mirrored the twin 
processes of banking liberalization/privatization and re-regulation, the latter in the form 
of safety nets and supervision. The liberalization/privatization momentum in CEEs 
amounted to systemic privatization (Feigenbaum et al., 1998), being part of a transition 
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process from state ownership and central planning to private ownership and market 
competition. A recent ECB study assesses that banking and financial markets in new 
member states remain significantly less integrated than those of the EU15 or the 
Eurozone, but integration is well under way and has accelerated notably, driven by an 
expanding EU banking presence (ECB, 2008). 
Yet, while subject to similar external pressures and constraints, post-communist 
CEEs followed individual political and economic transition paths, mainly owing to very 
different levels of institutional strength during the period of financial reform. Varying 
transition paths from central planning to market economy have resulted in different legal 
and politico-institutional frameworks, which have consequently affected the efficient 
functioning of banking systems. For example, in some cases privatization was 
implemented so as to benefit the political power holders of the previous and transitional 
regime, leading to what some have described as “political capitalism”, encouraging 
oligopolistic market structures (Staniszkis, 1991). In other post-communist banking 
systems, a stark dichotomy of ownership between post-communist state and foreign 
private capital has been observed, in what has been branded “capitalism without 
capitalists” (Eyal et al., 1998). Furthermore, the relatively weak legal systems of CEEs 
compared with their EU15 counterparts, as well as the high levels of networking and 
corruption in the financial system, may have limited the strength of competitive forces. 
Given the above similarities and differences in the processes of liberalizing the 
banking systems of EU15 and CEE countries we ask the following questions. Did 
reforms in the EU15 and CEE financial sectors (in the different periods that these 
occurred) succeeded in generating competitive conditions in the corresponding banking 
systems? What was the role of the institutional environment in shaping banking sector 
competition during the period of reforms? And, if results for the two subgroups are not 
uniform, what are the policy implications for future reform initiatives? To address these 
questions we first define periods of financial reform for each of the EU15 and CEE 
countries considered. Second, in an ambitious endeavor, we estimate the market power of 
individual banks in all these countries during the periods of reform. Subsequently, we 
examine whether the relationship between indicators of institutional strength and bank 
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market power is uniform across the two groups of countries. Finally, on the basis of our 
findings, we provide policy implications.  
 
2. Defining periods of financial reform 
We build a large panel dataset to investigate the bank competition-institutional 
strength nexus during the period of financial reform. The first issue in building this 
dataset is to define periods of financial reform for the EU15 and the CEE countries. To 
this end, we use the financial reforms index (henceforth FRI) of Abiad et al. (2008), 
which covers the EU15 countries and 17 CEEs.1 The FRI includes 91 countries in total 
over the period 1973-2005, whereas previous indices (e.g. the one of Kaminsky and 
Scmuckler, 2003, or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] 
index of banking sector reform) have smaller coverage in terms of years and/or countries. 
In addition, the FRI covers a wide array of reform processes.  
More specifically, this is a composite index including 7 pillars that receive a score 
on the basis of whether the financial sector is liberalized or not. These seven pillars, with 
range of scores in parentheses, are as follows: credit controls and reserve requirements 
(0-4), aggregate credit ceilings (0-1), interest rate liberalization (0-4), banking sector 
entry (0-5), capital account transactions (0-3), privatization (0-3), securities markets (0-5) 
and banking sector supervision (0-6). In general, low scores indicate repressed financial 
sectors and high scores liberalized financial sectors.2 In the present paper we exclude the 
capital account transactions pillar from the analysis because it does not directly refer to 
the banking sector, but rather it refers to the exchange rates system (unified or not) and to 
whether a country has restrictions on capital inflows or outflows. Therefore, we construct 
a composite indicator on the basis of the six other pillars, and this index can take values 
                                                 
1 The CEE group of countries includes Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. The EU15 group includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. 
2 For the last pillar (banking supervision) a high score indicates high regulation and a low score an 
unregulated financial sector. Note that a high score for this pillar implies that the country has reformed the 
banking sector so that (i) a capital adequacy ratio is adopted, (ii) banking supervisory agency is 
independent from executives’ influence, (iii) banking supervisory agency conducts effective supervisions 
through on-site and off-site examinations and (iv) the banking supervisory agency covers all financial 
institutions without exception. This kind of regulation is considered as a “positive” reform (re-regulation) 
aiming to enhance financial stability mainly through safety nets. Therefore, the value of this sub-index is 
added to the general FRI score. 
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from 0 to 28. As the index principally quantifies reforms in the banking sector, we use the 
terms “financial” and “banking” reform interchangeably.  
A number of criteria are set to build the final sample of countries on the basis of 
the FRI. First, from the 17 CEE countries included in the FRI we exclude Uzbekistan 
because the level of financial reform in this country remains particularly low (below 10) 
as of 2005 (no particular efforts of reform are observed); this leaves us with 16 CEEs. We 
also exclude Georgia and Kyrguz Republic because no indices characterizing the 
institutional environment are available for these two countries for the required time 
period; this leaves us with 14 CEEs. Second, the time span of the panel is different across 
countries for both the EU15 and the CEE groups. The reason is that, as discussed in the 
introduction, we investigate the bank competition-institutional strength nexus during 
periods of financial reform. The starting year for all EU15 countries is 1984, which is the 
first year of availability of data for the bank-level3 and institutional variables needed to 
carry out the empirical analysis. This is approximately the period when financial 
liberalization initiatives were undertaken in most of the countries in this group. In Table 1 
we report the score of the FRI for each country in 1984.  
In contrast, the starting year for the CEE panel varies between countries and 
corresponds to the first year of availability of the FRI (see Table 1). Note that the first 
year of data availability for the CEEs usually corresponds to the first year each of these 
countries is described as “transition” by the EBRD (2007). The end year for the countries 
in both the EU15 and the CEE panels is the year each country in the sample reaches a 
value of 19 on the FRI plus another 3 years (i.e. if a country reaches 19 on the FRI in 
2000 the panel is extended up to 2003). A value of 19 on the FRI implies that in the 6 
sub-categories of the index described above, the financial sector is “largely liberalized”. 
The panels are extended for 3 more years so that the market absorbs the changes.4 Note 
that for certain CEE countries the reform process was ongoing as of 2005, which is the 
                                                 
3 The Bankscope database, which is used to obtain the bank-level data, also provided us with some data for 
the years 1982-83. However, the ICRG database, which is used to obtain indices that characterize the 
institutional environment does not provide information on these indices prior to 1984. Also, we are not 
aware of a database that quantifies the quality of institutions with data prior to this year. Yet, we feel that 
the time span of the dataset is long enough to construct a rich database and carry out a meaningful 
empirical analysis.  
4 In the empirical analysis below we experimented by extending the time frame of the panels after the 
countries reached a score of 19 on the FRI by 2, 4 and 5 years. The results remained practically unchanged.  
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last year of available data on the FRI. Overall, these choices in building the dataset 
highlight an effort to examine whether institutional strength has important implications 
for the outcome of bank competition if policy makers decide to reform the banking sector 
and not to compare the arguably different reform processes among countries. Explicit 
information on the sample coverage of each country and on the FRI (score in the first and 
last year for each country) is provided in Table 1.       
 
3. Estimation of bank market power 
3.1. Empirical methodology and data 
We estimate the degree of bank market power during the period of financial 
reform in each country using bank-level data. We opt for estimating market power at the 
bank level because there may be wide differences across banks of the same industry. The 
approach followed is similar to that of Maudos and de Guevara (2007) and Delis and 
Tsionas (2009) who estimate the Lerner index of market power. The Lerner index is 
defined as  
( )qit it it itL p mc p= − /
q                 (1) 
and shows the disparity between interest rate ( qitp ) on bank i’s output (q) at time t and 
marginal cost (mc) expressed as a percentage of qitp . The main advantage of the Lerner 
index over other measures of market power (e.g. the H-statistic of Panzar and Rosse 
(1987)) is that it provides a continuous measure of the degree competition and therefore 
can have higher descriptive power when used as the dependent variable in the subsequent 
analysis of the determinants of competition. The Lerner index takes values between -1 
and 1, with values closer to 1 reflecting higher market power and values closer to 0 
increased competitive behavior of banks. In the case of pure monopoly, L is statistically 
equal to 1; under perfectly competitive behavior, L is statistically equal to 0; and, finally, 
L < 0 implies pricing below marginal cost. In the latter case it may be that banks do not 
function within the principles of a market economy and are supported e.g. by the 
government, which is a situation indicative of totalitarian systems.  
Given the significant concerns of the industrial organization and banking 
literatures regarding the imposition of a constant marginal cost across banks when 
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estimating the Lerner index, we relax this assumption. In particular, we opt for a 
modeling framework that allows mc to differ across banks and time, thus deviating from 
the majority of previous literature on the estimation of the Lerner index (which assumes a 
constant marginal cost). In this respect, we follow Delis and Tsionas (2009) in using a 
non-parametric technique to estimate observation-specific marginal costs from a cost 
function. In particular, here we resort to the estimation of the following Cobb-Douglas 
cost function  
0 1 2 3ln ln ln lnit it it it itc a a q a d a w e= + + + +                       (2) 
where c is the total cost of bank i at time t, q is bank output, d is the value of bank 
deposits, w are the prices of inputs and e is a stochastic disturbance. This cost function 
assumes that banks use inputs and deposits to produce output q (for a similar 
implementation, see e.g. Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005; Brissimis et al., 2008). From Eq. (2), 
the marginal cost of bank output is simply a1. Hence, in order to obtain observation-
specific estimates of the marginal cost, we need to obtain observation-specific estimates 
of a1. This is accomplished by drawing on a non-parametric estimation technique to 
estimate Eq. (2), in particular the local regression (LR) technique as put forth by 
Cleveland and Devlin (1988). Bank-level estimates of all of the as (and thus of a1) are 
obtained through localization of the parameters. For details on the LR methodology and 
the estimation procedure, see Appendix.  
Estimation of Eq. (2) using the aforementioned technique presents some 
considerable advantages, besides the obvious one of deriving observation-specific 
estimates of the marginal cost. First, the non-parametric nature of the method implies that 
no assumption regarding the functional form of the underlying production relationship is 
made globally, and it is well-known that it is quite difficult for the researcher to be 
certain that the “correct” functional form has been chosen. Therefore, choosing for 
example between the Cobb-Douglas, the translog or any other cost function is not an 
issue.5 Second, and given this qualification, economic hypotheses are not rejected simply 
because an “improper” functional form has been chosen. Third, localization implies that, 
besides obtaining bank-level marginal costs, bank-level elasticities of cost with respect to 
                                                 
5 In fact, we have experimented with the translog cost function and we obtained very similar results (within 
a 5 per cent range). 
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deposits and input prices are also obtained, which may be quite useful information for 
managers and policy-makers. In particular, banks may have market power in deposits, 
which can also be calculated on the basis of a different Lerner index on deposit rates and 
a2. Last, but not least, the fact that LR (or any other local method) allows for observation-
specific parameter estimates suggests a plausible approach to identify parameter 
heterogeneity, which may be of great importance in indicating individual bank strategies. 
For more on these issues, see Kumbhakar et al. (2007).  
Data for the bank variables are taken from BankScope. All data are reported in 
euros and are expressed in constant 1994 prices (using individual country GDP 
deflators).6We limit the empirical analysis to the unconsolidated statements of 
commercial banks in order to reduce the possibility of introducing aggregation bias in the 
results. During the sample period a number of M&As and bank failures took place, which 
are taken into account in our dataset so as to avoid selectivity bias. Only banks with at 
least three sequential observations are included in the sample. Also, the data were 
reviewed for reporting errors or other inconsistencies (zero or negative values for the 
variables used) and some observations are excluded accordingly. We end up with a large 
unbalanced panel dataset that consists of 22846 observations (14381 for the EU15 and 
8465 for the CEE countries). The number of bank observations by country is reported in 
Table 1.  
The price of bank output qp is proxied by the ratio of total revenue to total 
earning assets, so as to reflect the full array of bank outputs. Alternatively, we employed 
the ratio of interest income to the value of total loans. This measure is probably more 
restrictive for our purpose as it essentially measures lending rates and will reflect market 
power only in lending, but it is also the measure favored by most of the literature (see e.g. 
Maudos and de Guevara, 2007). As regards the bank-level variables in Eq. (2), c is 
measured by real total expenses of bank i at time t, q by real total earning assets and d by 
real total deposits and short-term funding. Two input prices are considered, the first (w1) 
representing the price of labor (measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total 
                                                 
6 Here we use the intermediation method in the definition of inputs and outputs. For details, see Berger and 
Humphrey (1997). 
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assets)7 and the second (w2) the price of physical capital (proxied by the ratio of total 
depreciation and other capital expenses to total fixed assets). All these variables were 
carefully reviewed for inconsistencies owing to changes in accounting schemes over the 
sample period (descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2). In addition, we examined 
the sensitivity of our results by controlling for credit risk (using the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans). Changes in the results were not significant; however, 
this measure was not available for many of the banks in the early years of our sample for 
both the EU15 and CEE countries. Therefore, we report the results of the model without 
credit risk. 
 
3.2. Estimation results 
 Estimation of Eq. (2) is carried out for the full sample, since (i) the Lerner index 
does need defining the market boundaries because it simply represents bank-specific 
markups and (ii) bank-level (and thus also country-level) heterogeneity is accounted for 
by the local technique.8 Average estimates for L on a country- and time-specific basis are 
reported in Table 3. In general, L averages at 0.34 for the full sample with a minimum 
equal to -2.34 and a maximum 3.21. 96% of the banks fall in the range that has an 
economic interpretation as set out above. Note that the values reported in Table 3 are 
directly comparable between countries and through time. Two stars indicate that the 
hypothesis of perfectly competitive behavior (no market power) cannot be rejected, while 
a single star shows that pricing of banking products is below marginal cost (i.e. banks do 
not behave as profit-maximizing firms). No banking sector is characterized by 
monopolistic behavior on average. In general, a simple t-test shows that approximately 8 
percentage points reflect statistical differences between the values of L (e.g. there is 
considerable difference in bank market power between L=0.22 and L=0.30).  
The overall picture emerging from the average scores of the countries examined is 
mixed. In most EU15 countries, the average market power is found to be between 0.10 
                                                 
7 We divide personnel expenses by total assets because the Bankscope database lacks data for the number 
of bank employees for many banks. A similar approach has been followed by many other relevant papers 
(see e.g. Altunbas et al., 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). 
8 Various other sensitivity analyses were carried out, including use of time or country dummy variables, use 
of only one input price and separation of the EU15 and CEE samples. Changes in the results were not 
statistically significant, thus confirming the power of the local regression method (see also Delis and 
Tsionas, 2009).  
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and 0.40, which represents moderately competitive behavior to a larger or lesser degree. 
Interestingly enough, lower values are observed for many countries shortly after financial 
reforms intensified, which is a first indication that financial reforms in the EU15 
countries led to increased competition between banks. For Germany, the findings suggest 
that its banking sector could be characterized as perfectly competitive during the period 
1987-1990 and that the banking industry is fairly competitive in general. This result is 
consistent with the fact that the German banking sector is comprised of a large number of 
relatively small banks. Two special cases are on the one hand the Scandinavian countries 
and on the other hand Greece and Portugal. In Finland and Norway the market power of 
banks has been increasing on average since the early 1990s, and this may be the result of 
the policies undertaken to enhance the profitability of banks in light of the severe banking 
crisis that hit these countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For Greece (principally) 
and Portugal, the rising market power of banks may reflect the inadequate supervision 
and monitoring capacity of the regulatory authorities, while, especially in Greece, the 
majority of banking assets were publicly controlled in the early years of our study9 and 
financial reforms were belated compared to the other EU15 countries.  
The results obtained for the CEE countries are on average quite different from 
those for their EU15 equivalents and more or less similar to the ones obtained for Greece. 
In the beginning of the sample period most banks were operating with low or negative 
market power, which is consistent with the nature of the old regime. However, financial 
reform periods in CEEs are associated with significant increases in the average market 
power of banks. Moreover, the sharpest increases in the average market power of banks 
are observed in countries that reformed their banking sector quickly and intensively (e.g. 
Latvia, Hungary and Ukraine). Interesting exceptions to these patterns are Czech 
Republic, Russia and Belarus, where the average Lerner index remains relatively low as 
of 2005. This is probably not without a good explanation. In Czech Republic institutions 
were quite stronger than in the rest of the CEEs, which may have helped the efficient 
supervision and monitoring of the banking sector during the transition path, and 
penetration of foreign owned banks in the market immense (84.9% of total banking assets 
                                                 
9 Public ownership of banks may be associated with lower incentives to maximize profits. 
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belong to foreign owned banks10). Russia is a special case altogether owing to the 
probably unique political regime (i.e. relatively large political power of the party in office 
and associated strength to promote policy initiatives) and still high share of state owned 
banks, while in Belarus the financial reform process has been the most gradual and 
delayed among the CEE countries examined. Yet, before making more judgments on the 
determinants of competition, we better move to an explicit analysis of the institutional 
and other sources of bank market power.     
 
4. Bank competition and the institutional environment 
4.1. Empirical model and data 
The empirical model used to study the institutional sources of bank competition is 
of the following form:  
0 1 2 3 4it t t t it it
it i it




= + + + + +
= +
            (3) 
In Eq. (3) the market power L of banks obtained in the previous section is written as a 
function of the time-dependent banking sector reform variable FRI; a vector of variables 
IE that characterize the institutional environment; a vector of control variables M that 
reflect the macroeconomic conditions in the banking systems examined; and a vector of 
bank-level control variables Z. Finally, ε is the disturbance with ν the unobserved bank-
specific effect and u the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way panel data error component 
regression model, where ν~ΙΙΝ (0, 2νσ ) and independent of u~IIN (0, ). 
2
uσ
Table 2 lists the potential determinants of bank competition used in this study, 
along with some descriptive statistics. As discussed above data on the FRI are obtained 
from Abiad et al. (2008). Note that banking industry studies use various other measures 
of the reform process. For instance, Salas and Saurina (2003) and Kumbhakar and 
Lozano-Vivas (2005) employ all the deregulation events that occurred in the period under 
examination to capture the deregulation process in the Spanish banking industry. 
Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) measure deregulation via changes in minimum capital 
requirements, or through the abrogation of the interest rate ceilings policy. Yildirim and 
                                                 
10 Foreign owned banks are defined as those with foreign ownership exceeding 50 per cent 
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Philippatos (2007) choose foreign bank penetration to capture deregulation. Other studies 
use, inter alia, abolition of entry restrictions as deregulatory proxies (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt 
et al., 2004). Here, we prefer using the FRI as it quantifies financial reform stricto sensu 
and because it is the only index that includes countries from both the EU15 and CEE 
groups, thus making the analysis of the two subgroups directly comparable. 
The variables IE in Eq. (3) correspond to a number of indices that assess 
institutional strength in the countries considered. In particular, we use three indices 
obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to proxy corruption within 
the political system (denoted as corruption), the quality of the judicial system and 
popular observance of law (lawqual) and the quality of the bureaucracy (bureauqual), 
respectively. Higher values for these indices reflect higher institutional quality. The 
variables corruption and lawqual take values between 0 and 6 (inclusive) and the variable 
bureauqual between 0 and 4. Table 1 reports country-specific average for these variables. 
The most common form of corruption, which is also relevant for our purposes, is 
financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected 
with all sorts of transactions. Such corruption usually makes markets less efficient and 
generates networking effects that could lead, inter alia, to anticompetitive behavior. Our 
measure accounts for various forms of corruption, such as excessive patronage, nepotism, 
job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding and suspiciously close ties 
between politics and business. The variable lawqual, in turn, is an assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, as well as of the popular observance of the 
law. Therefore, a country can enjoy a high rating in terms of the quality of the judicial 
system, but a low rating if enforcement is inferior. These are important for bank 
competition, because the index reflects the ability of policy authorities to (i) identify 
various forms of anticompetitive conduct in banking and (ii) impose sanctions. Finally, 
the institutional strength and quality of the bureau tends to minimize revisions of policy 
when governments change, enhances states’ role in identifying non-competitive conduct 
and safeguards the regulatory environment in an efficient way. Hence, both lawqual and 
bureauqual are expected to have a positive impact on bank competition. 
In Eq. (3) we control for a number of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables 
that may affect the market power of banks. Specifically, we use measures of bank 
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capitalization and size as proxies for the bank characteristics that may lead to differences 
in bank market power; and we control for elements of bank ownership and 
macroeconomic conditions that could also lead to structural changes that affect bank 
competition. In particular, we use the ratio of equity capital to total assets (capitalization) 
to control for bank capitalization and the natural logarithm of real total assets (banksize) 
to proxy bank size.11 Well-capitalized and larger banks are probably able to set higher 
margins or have access to cheaper source of funds due to scale economies, informational 
asymmetries and moral hazard issues. However, in relatively competitive markets or in 
banking systems were efficient tacit collusion is in place we do not expect these effects to 
be present.  
To capture the effect of public and foreign ownership we use the asset share of 
public (public) and foreign (foreign) owned banks in the industry. Foreign (publicly) 
owned banks are defined as those with foreign (public) ownership exceeding 50 per cent. 
To construct these variables we use information from the banks in our sample only. This 
may be thought of as a source of selectivity bias; however, our sample includes a large 
portion of the total intermediated assets in the countries considered (approximately 77%) 
and we feel that these variables are very important elements in our analysis. That is, 
penetration of foreign owned banks is considered as a significant element of increased 
competition and better quality of reforms through positive spillovers (see e.g. Javorcik, 
2004), while public ownership may lead to either higher market power (mainly owing to 
networking effects) or to a non-optimizing behavior of banks in relatively 
underdeveloped banking systems (if governments use commercial banks for purposes 
other than profit).  
Finally, we control for the impact of the macroeconomic environment common to 
all banks in terms of (i) economic development by including the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita (gdpcapita), and (ii) stability in the monetary conditions by including the 
                                                 
11 We have additionally experimented with measures of bank liquidity (measured by the ratio of liquid 
assets to total deposits) and bank risk-taking (measured either by the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans or the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans) as bank-level control variables, however we did not 
find significant changes in the results on our main variables. At the same time the sample is greatly reduced 
when including the aforementioned variables owing to missing data in the early years of our sample period.  
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consumer price index (inflation) among the regressors. These macroeconomic variables 
are obtained from the World Development Indicators and the EBRD.12
 
4.2. Estimation results 
Two econometric concerns of the regressions of bank market power may be the 
dynamic nature of bank competition and the potential endogeneity of some of the right-
hand side variables. Concerning the former, Berger et al. (2000) among others suggest 
that even developed banking systems may be characterized by informational opacity, 
networking and relationship lending. All these elements will cause bank rents and market 
power to persist to a various degree. To account for this type of persistence in our 
econometric model, we include the lagged dependent variable among the regressors and 
we use the method of Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panels to estimate Eq. (3).13 
Besides accounting for the specified dynamics, the latter estimator has two additional 
virtues. First, it does not break down in the presence of unit roots (for a proof see Binder 
et al., 2003); and, second, it accommodates the possible endogeneity between market 
power and some of the independent variables by means of appropriate instruments. In 
general, a value of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable statistically equal to 0 
implies that bank market power is characterized by high speed of adjustment, while a 
value statistically equal to 1 means that the adjustment is very slow. Values between 0 
and 1 suggest that market power persists, but will eventually return to its normal 
(average) level. Finally, this coefficient takes implausible (negative) values if 
convergence to equilibrium cannot be achieved, which probably indicates a problem with 
the dataset (i.e., very small time dimension of the panel).14
The FRI and the bank-level variables capitalization and banksize are considered 
to be endogenous determinants of market power. On the one hand, higher market power 
may yield higher profits and therefore higher levels of capital or it may simply be that 
banks with higher market power have better access to equity capital markets. The same 
                                                 
12 Ideally, one may also want to control for elements like stock market capitalization, the importance of 
banking in financing economic activity etc. However, the present analysis is constrained by the availability 
of data for the early years of our dataset on these country characteristics. 
13 Note that the economic interpretation of the values of L does not imply that this is a censored variable. 
Econometrically this variable can take any value and therefore a censored-type regression is not required. 
14 For more on these issues, see Nerlove (2002). 
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type of reverse causality may prevail as regards the relationship between market power 
and size. On the other hand, banks usually perceive financial reform and foreign bank 
entry as bound to happen once these begin, which triggers a situation of self-fulfilling 
expectations. Under this assumption banks may price their products in light of the 
forthcoming developments in the banking sector or it could be that banks with market 
power may even exacerbate changes that serve their own interest (especially if 
institutions are weak in general). As regards the institutional strength variables per se, it 
may hold that banks observe the level of institutional strength and ownership in the 
beginning of the period and set their interest rate levels accordingly. To this end, the 
institutional and ownership variables are better modeled as predetermined. Note that in 
terms of the Blundell and Bond method, endogeneity implies treating the respective 
variables symmetrically with the dependent variable as regards the instruments used. 
More specifically, and with the aim of a Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, the 
second and third lags of the market power, financial reform and bank-level variables are 
used as instruments. On the other hand, predeterminancy implies that in addition to the 
second and third lags, the first lag of the predetermined variables also serves as a valid 
instrument. Bearing these issues in mind we now turn to the discussion of our empirical 
results. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the estimation results for the EU15 and the CEE countries, 
respectively, as obtained from a number of different specifications. All specifications 
include time effects15 and they seem to fit the panel reasonably well (see associated Wald 
statistics) with the coefficients across the alternative specifications being fairly stable. In 
addition, the Sargan test validates the use of the instruments described above (equations 
are not overidentified). Even though some of the equations indicate that first-order 
autocorrelation (AR1) is present, this does not indicate that the estimates are inconsistent. 
Inconsistency would be implied if second-order autocorrelation was present (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998), but this case is rejected by the test for AR2 errors. The coefficients on 
the lagged dependent variable average among the different specifications at 0.352 and 
0.435 for the EU15 and CEE subgroups, respectively. Given the discussion on the lagged 
dependent variable above, these values indicate persistence of bank market power to a 
                                                 
15 Country effects are not included because they are highly correlated with the institutional variables. 
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moderate extent and, as higher values are observed in the CEE regressions, this is a first 
indication of the relative opaqueness and rigidity of the CEE banking systems.  
The first specification in both Tables 4 and 5 corresponds to a simple regression 
of L on the FRI and bank-level control variables. The results pose an immediate 
challenge, since opposite and statistically significant signs are found for the coefficient 
on FRI for the EU15 and CEE cases. In EU15, a negative impact of FRI on market power 
is identified, which is in line with our expectations. In contrast, in the CEE regressions 
FRI enters with a positive and significant coefficient, which suggests that financial 
reforms increase bank market power in these countries. The first consideration would be 
to control for the institutional and macroeconomic environment and for the ownership 
variables, so as to examine whether the impact of FRI is modified. This task is carried out 
in the second specification, however again the findings are different between the two 
subgroups. In the EU15 countries the impact of FRI remains negative and significant. 
The institutional variables also enter the equation with a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, implying that increased transparency (lower corruption) and 
bureaucratic and law quality contribute to lower market power of banks. However, in the 
CEE countries, FRI remains positive (even though it loses on significance), while from 
the institutional variables only corruption enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient. 
These divergent results between the two groups call for a deeper investigation of 
the relationship between market power on the one hand and reforms and institutional 
quality on the other. Given the fact that in those CEEs identified with stronger 
institutional capacity market power is lower on average (e.g. Czech Republic), and in 
EU15 countries with lower values on the institutional indices market power is higher (e.g. 
Greece), we examine the existence of non-linearity in the impact of the financial reform 
and institutional variables. This analysis is carried out in the third specification of Tables 
4 and 5 by adding squared terms on the FRI and institutional variables. In the EU15 case 
the results remain practically unchanged, which implies that the impact of reform 
initiatives and institutions is linear. In contrast, significant non-linearity concerning all 
these variables is identified in the CEE case (a U-shaped relationship is found). This 
reflects the fact that at the outset of transition in post-communist countries, the rule of 
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law and the bureaucracy were characterized by low capacity and/or inefficient 
implementation of the necessary transformations, which spilled over to the level of 
competition in the banking system. In contrast, the respective EU bureaucracy and the 
qualitative characteristics of the legal environment has not been a burden in the endeavor 
of improved competition and efficiency. Notably, the impact of the squared terms is more 
significant than the impact of their levels and this suggests that financial reforms and 
better institutions do promote competition after a certain threshold of capacity. 
One could actually calculate the threshold values for each variable by using the 
second derivative of each equation (i.e. calculate the ratio of the coefficient on the level 
over two times the coefficient on the squared term). For the regression of column 3 these 
values are 15.35 for FRI,16 4.35 for corruption, 4.25 for lawqual and 2.57 for 
bureauqual. Hence, at least for our sample, the CEE countries should reach these values 
in order to see any benefit in terms of increased competition. 
The effect of increased foreign ownership on market power deserves special 
attention as it appears to be negative and significant across all estimated equations. This 
result is in line with previous literature that views foreign bank entry as the means to 
achieve higher efficiency through increased competition and better quality of reforms 
through positive spillovers (see e.g. Javorcik, 2004). Notably, the negative relationship is 
stronger in the CEE case, which may reflect the fact that the increased penetration of 
foreign institutions in the CEE markets are partially responsible for the somewhat 
decreasing market power of banks towards the last years of reform (see Table 3b). In 
contrast, if privatization occurs mainly to domestic investors, who may engage in anti-
competitive conduct more easily, then market power will probably rise. Effectively, this 
is also related with the relationship between public ownership and market power, which 
(in contrast to the EU15 case) is found to be positive and significant at the 5 per cent 
level for CEE banks. This suggests that publicly owned banks retain excess market power 
in the CEE countries.  
Concerning the rest of the control variables the results are in line with 
expectations. Higher bank capital and size are positively related with L, which is intuitive 
                                                 
16 Note that most of the EU15 countries obtain values on the FRI considerably lower than 15.35 in 1984 
(the starting year of our sample for this group). This suggests that even though we lack data prior to 1984, 
selectivity bias is not the reason behind the linear relationship between FRI and L in the EU15 case. 
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because these banks are usually able to set higher interest rate margins or have access to a 
wider range of markets and further increase their market power therefrom. The fact that 
in the more opaque CEE banking systems the impact of bank size is stronger confirms 
this reasoning. The impact of gdpcapita on L is different between the two subgroups, 
being negative in the EU15 banking systems and positive in the CEE ones. Even though 
marginally significant in both subsamples, this result may again show that richer 
countries are better able to monitor the market power of banks. Finally, inflation has a 
negative and significant impact in both subgroups, a result suggesting that monetary 
anomalies hurt banks’ interest rates and lower their profit margins. Note that this result is 
probably driven by the early years of our sample and the years of the Scandinavian and 
Russian crises.      
In the rest of the specifications we inquire into the robustness of our findings by 
(i) examining whether the results in the two subgroups are driven by Germany and Russia 
(i.e. the two countries with a big number of banks), (ii) examining the impact of outliers 
and (iii) using a panel data instrumental variables (IV) regression instead of a GMM one. 
In the first two cases (see columns 4 and 5) our results remain practically unchanged 
(only the impact of public ownership becomes insignificant in the CEE group). For the 
IV regressions we used the same set of instruments with the GMM regressions and the 
results are provided in column 6 of both tables. The fit of the regressions is somewhat 
lower than the GMM equivalent, however no big qualitative differences are found. 
Overall, the results emphasize the role of the quality of institutions (in terms mainly of 
capacity and efficiency) and foreign ownership in elevating levels of bank competition. 
This leads us to our conclusions.    
  
5. Conclusions 
If bank competition had been an objective of sectoral liberalization and reform, 
we see it materialize in the EU15 but far less so in the CEE banking sectors, where the 
market power of individual banks appears to be increasing during and shortly after the 
period of reform initiatives. We are reminded once again that the efficient functioning of 
the banking system is not only a matter of liberalization and privatization; it requires 
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mature capitalist – including regulatory – institutions, which were relatively lacking in 
post-communist systems. 
In this paper we examined the impact of the quality of institutions on bank market 
power during the period of financial reforms in EU15 and CEE countries. The period of 
financial reform in each country has been carefully selected on the basis of the Abiad et 
al. (2008) index, while market power has been estimated at the individual bank-level 
across a large number of banks. Our empirical findings confirm the importance of 
institutional quality, in terms of a positive relationship with bank competition. Thus, 
institutional endowment is vital for the enhancement of competition following financial 
liberalization. In particular, the rule of law and bureaucratic quality are negatively related 
with market power: when they suffer, banks tend to acquire significantly higher market 
power through higher interest rates at the expense of investors and, by extension, 
economic growth. Well-performing legal and bureaucratic institutions in the EU15 
allowed market competition to emerge as a direct aftermath of sectoral liberalization. The 
same policies of banking liberalization failed to engender proper competition in the CEE 
countries before an adequate level of legal, institutional and bureaucratic quality had been 
reached. Sectoral reform in transition economies does not produce the same efficiency 
gains as in developed economies until it is backed by well-functioning institutions.  
In line with the literature that views foreign bank entry as efficiency-enhancing, 
foreign penetration also seems to be a crucial factor of increased competition. In other 
words, market openness and foreign entry contribute significantly to the institutional 
upgrade of transition economies, enhancing the efficient functioning of their banking 
sectors. Privatization without foreign entry is not an adequate factor in itself, thus 
echoing the findings of scholars who have underlined the crony capitalist tendencies 
witnessed in the early transition stage of privatizing post-communist states.  
Overall, our findings corroborate a structural division between EU15 and CEE 
economies. The competitive effects of banking system reform are linear in the former 
group of countries but non-linear in the latter: they are exhibited only above a threshold 
of system “maturity”, following considerable exposure to foreign investors and the 
overcoming of institutional and legal entry barriers.  
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Appendix. The local regression method 
A thorough discussion of local regression is provided in Loader (1999); here we 
only provide a basic analysis. LR estimation is a consistent way to allow for 
nonparametric effects within the parametric model, and this is accomplished as follows. 
The underlying model for local regression is ( )i iY x iμ ε= + , where x are predictor 
variables and Y is the response variable. The unknown function μ(x) is assumed to be 
smooth and is estimated by fitting a polynomial model (a quadratic in our case, as in most 
of the literature) within a local sliding window. Therefore, no strong assumptions are 
made about μ globally, but locally around x we assume that μ can be well approximated. 
Note that this not a strong assumption when using large and rich datasets like the one of 
the present analysis. For a fitting point x, define a bandwidth h that controls the 
smoothness of the fit and a smoothing window (x-h(x), x+h(x)). To estimate μ, only 
observations within this sliding window are used. Therefore, for each fitting point a 
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where W is the weight function that assigns largest weights to observations close to x, and 
takes the form  
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The local least squares criterion of Eq. (A.1) is minimized to produce estimates 0aˆ  d 1ˆa  
r each observation.
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fo   
This discussion relates to the bivariate local regression. The multivariate local 
regression simply adds further terms to the right hand-side of the formula for Y and 
associated with Eq. (A.1). Estimations were carried out using the program Locfit. An 
important issue in the implementation of LR is the choice of an optimal bandwidth. Many 
alternatives have been proposed, like plug-in methods and cross-validation (see 
Kumbhakar et al., 2007). Here we used the generalized cross-validation method (see 
Loader, 1999), which in our case yields a bandwidth equal to 0.701. For other 
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applications of local methods to bank data, see e.g. Kumbhakar et al. (2007) and Delis 
and Tsionas (2009). 
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Sample coverage and averages of country-level variables  
Country  Sample Bank obs. FRI range corruption lawqual bureauqual public foreign gdpcapita inflation 
Austria 1984-2005 825 8.5-18.5 4.82 6.00 3.90   21179.63 2.41 
Belgium 1984-1995 502 12.25-20 5.19 6.00 4.00   18164.56 2.84 
Denmark 1984-1995 581 14.25-20.25 6.00 6.00 4.00   24123.97 3.37 
Finland 1984-2005 622 10.5-18 6.00 6.00 3.98   20666.29 2.84 
France 1984-1996 629 9-20 5.32 5.37 3.98   18657.19 3.23 
Germany 1984-1996 6742 15-19 5.29 5.56 4.00   19100.61 3.09 
Greece 1984-2005 515 4.75-19 4.28 3.85 2.69   12253.78 10.71 
Ireland 1984-1989 141 10.75-20 5.00 4.06 3.50   11352.91 4.54 
Italy 1984-2000 607 8-19 3.71 5.28 3.20   16480.73 5.20 
Netherlands 1984-1990 298 18-20 6.00 6.00 4.00   17311.54 1.31 
Norway 1984-2005 522 9.5-18.25 5.57 6.00 3.79   32327.04 3.43 
Portugal 1984-2005 679 3-16.5 4.49 5.11 2.69   9205.08 7.73 
Spain 1984-1995 710 10.5-21 4.17 4.67 3.01   10756.43 6.53 
Sweden 1984-1989 128 9.75-19 6.00 6.00 4.00   21970.13 6.02 
UK 1984-1989 880 17-20 5.75 4.46 4.00   18178.91 5.22 
           
Albania 1991-2005 101 0-19 2.75 2.80 1.23 72.35 27.30 1063.66 30.66 
Ajerbaijan 1991-2005 151 6-16 2.93 3.69 1.00 72.14 2.21 747.37 297.04 
Belarus 1992-2005 129 7.5-10.5 3.44 3.68 1.00 65.27 6.01 1274.16 379.46 
Bulgaria 1991-2005 235 5.75-17.25 3.35 4.43 2.00 46.88 41.61 1611.16 126.60 
Czech Rep 1990-2004 192 4.75-19.25 3.96 5.24 3.00 51.10 37.13 5325.56 10.41 
Estonia 1991-2001 88 8.5-22 4.74 3.60 2.42 19.56 37.08 3443.18 129.71 
Hungary 1990-2004 232 9.5-20.25 4.46 5.02 3.54 33.23 45.20 4349.53 17.17 
Kazakhstan 1991-2005 190 4.75-16 2.72 3.67 1.96 14.38 13.79 1338.12 372.65 
Latvia 1992-1999 170 8.5-21 3.41 3.54 2.00 13.93 44.09 2564.19 55.75 
Lithuania 1992-2005 112 4.75-19.25 3.08 3.72 2.17 35.06 47.39 3346.48 113.37 
Poland 1990-2005 435 6.75-17.5 3.90 4.70 3.01 53.91 33.77 3938.76 53.34 
Romania 1990-2005 292 2.75-17.5 3.17 4.21 0.98 64.00 25.81 1781.36 81.78 
Russia 1993-2005 5645 10.5-18 1.93 3.46 1.35 48.40 6.75 1844.13 126.99 
Ukraine 1991-2005 493 8.5-15.5 2.66 3.67 1.44 28.05 8.14 800.86 500.14 
Note: The table reports information on the sample and average values for country-level variables. Sample is the time coverage 
for each country that correspond to period of financial reform; Bank obs. is the number of bank observations of each country;  
FRI range is the score on the FRI in the beginning and the end of each country’s reform period. The rest of the variables  




Table 2  
Descriptive statistics for the bank-level variables 
 EU15 countries CEE countries 
 Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max 
c 117310 355722 18345 450788 55610 191722 8710 322368 
q 2357890 3.36e+06 45678 4.90e+08 525017 2186535 22431 7677422 
d 1759808 2.66e+06 22784 3.37e+08 427563 1566255 17421 5728463 
p 0.076 0.512 0.006 0.321 0.117 1.255 0.013 0.891 
w1 0.037 0.011 0.006 0.085 0.023 0.015 0.002 0.070 
wB2 1.244 0.732 0.205 5.420 1.027 0.707 0.180 5.050 
capitalization 2.72 2.29 -6.39 10.84 4.19 3.44 -9.80 11.10 
banksize 12.90 2.32 10.02 20.10 12.07 2.07 9.82 17.86 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics of the bank-level variables used in the empirical 
analysis. The variables are defined as follows. c: real total expenses (proxy of bank cost); q: real 
total earning assets (proxy of bank output); d: real total deposits and short-term funding; p: total 
revenue/total earning assets (proxy of the price of bank output|); w1: personnel expenses/total assets 
(price of labor); w2: total depreciation and other capital expenses/total fixed assets (proxy for the 
price of physical capital; capitalization: equity capital/total assets (proxy for bank capitalization); 





Bank competition in EU15 countries 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Nethe. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
1984 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.18 0.34 0.19 -0.09* 0.29 0.37 0.36 0.18 -0.01** 0.31 0.24 0.28 
1985 0.37 0.39 0.26 0.15 0.32 0.15 -0.03** 0.27 0.34 0.33 0.16 0.01** 0.28 0.18 0.25 
1986 0.33 0.42 0.22 0.16 0.27 0.09 0.04** 0.25 0.34 0.35 0.10 0.06** 0.22 0.12 0.20 
1987 0.22 0.29 0.14 0.11 0.25 0.06** 0.04** 0.24 0.31 0.27 0.11 0.05** 0.17 0.13 0.12 
1988 0.20 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.26 0.07** 0.08** 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.10 
1989 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.07** 0.23 0.06** 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 
1990 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.26 0.08** 0.15  0.24 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.14   
1991 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.27 0.10 0.18  0.23  0.20 0.24 0.15   
1992 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.11 0.22  0.20  0.22 0.33 0.18   
1993 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.30 0.10 0.24  0.18  0.33 0.38 0.20   
1994 0.17 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.12 0.29  0.23  0.35 0.35 0.19   
1995 0.16 0.16 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.13 0.36  0.25  0.43 0.38 0.20   
1996 0.20   0.42 0.29 0.12 0.45  0.22  0.42 0.40    
1997 0.19   0.40   0.49  0.26  0.40 0.43    
1998 0.19   0.41   0.51  0.29  0.44 0.51    
1999 0.22   0.49   0.55  0.31  0.45 0.48    
2000 0.20   0.43   0.62  0.30  0.43 0.55    
2001 0.21   0.42   0.70    0.48 0.43    
2002 0.23   0.45   0.68    0.43 0.38    
2003 0.24   0.42   0.66    0.46 0.39    
2004 0.23   0.43   0.77    0.49 0.40    
2005 0.28   0.43   0.74    0.47 0.38    
Note: The economic interpretation of the Lerner index (L) is made for values between -1 and 1, with values closer to 1 reflecting higher market power and values 
closer to 0 increased competition. Negative values reflect non-optimizing behavior of banks. In the case of pure monopoly, L is statistically equal to 1 (denoted 
by ***); under perfectly competitive behavior, L is statistically equal to 0 (denoted by **); and, finally, L < 0 (denoted by *) implies pricing below marginal cost. 







Bank competition in CEE countries 
 Albania Ajer. Belarus Bulgaria 
Czech 
Rep Estonia Hungary Kazak Latvia Lithu. Poland Romania Russia Ukraine 
1990     0.03**  0.12    0.06** -0.16*   
1991 0.07** -0.09*  0.09 0.03** 0.04** 0.17 -0.22*   0.12 -0.14*  -0.03** 
1992 0.09 -0.09* -0.12* 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.21 -0.20* 0.14 0.06** 0.20 -0.12* 0.09 0.06** 
1993 0.18 -0.03** -0.06** 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.01** 0.22 0.13 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.15 
1994 0.27 -0.01** 0.03** 0.21 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.07** 0.31 0.17 0.42 0.10 0.14 0.17 
1995 0.41 0.03** 0.05** 0.42 0.27 0.42 0.44 0.14 0.46 0.31 0.49 0.13 0.16 0.20 
1996 0.43 0.19 0.08** 0.50 0.28 0.44 0.53 0.18 0.65 0.43 0.51 0.22 0.13 0.19 
1997 0.51 0.28 0.12 0.55 0.29 0.60 0.61 0.31 0.72 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.11 0.22 
1998 0.59 0.45 0.09 0.51 0.25 0.68 0.55 0.37 0.80 0.55 0.57 0.50 0.14 0.24 
1999 0.62 0.48 0.16 0.50 0.26 0.59 0.58 0.44 0.86 0.60 0.68 0.60 0.17 0.25 
2000 0.60 0.61 0.18 0.48 0.27 0.55 0.68 0.42 0.79 0.62 0.73 0.54 0.15 0.36 
2001 0.66 0.55 0.20 0.55 0.26 0.58 0.71 0.49 0.79 0.60 0.78 0.57 0.20 0.42 
2002 0.60 0.51 0.25 0.61 0.22  0.68 0.45 0.76 0.65 0.75 0.50 0.18 0.60 
2003 0.54 0.53 0.22 0.67 0.23  0.67 0.48  0.75 0.73 0.48 0.20 0.64 
2004 0.48 0.49 0.20 0.66 0.21  0.69 0.56  0.66 0.70 0.56 0.16 0.70 
2005 0.52 0.44 0.23 0.59    0.53  0.63 0.66 0.58 0.19 0.65 
Note: The economic interpretation of the Lerner index (L) is made for values between -1 and 1, with values closer to 1 reflecting higher market power 
and values closer to 0 increased competition. Negative values reflect non-optimizing behavior of banks. In the case of pure monopoly, L is statistically 
equal to 1 (denoted by ***); under perfectly competitive behavior, L is statistically equal to 0 (denoted by **); and, finally, L < 0 (denoted by *) implies 

























Lt-1 0.341*** 0.359*** 0.362*** 0.345*** 0.355***  
 (3.82) (3.91) (4.07) (3.87) (3.89)  
FRI -1.018** -1.046** -1.057** -1.046** -1.059** -1.037** 
  (2.09) (2.50) (2.65) (2.54) (2.68) (2.66) 
FRI2   0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 
   (0.54) (0.46) (0.63) (0.61) 
corruption  -0.348*** -0.370*** -0.182*** -0.368*** -0.362*** 
   (5.22) (5.36) (3.18) (5.76) (5.65) 
corruption2   0.017 -0.005 0.006 0.011 
   (0.16) (-0.02) (0.05) (0.10) 
lawqual  -0.332*** -0.320*** -0.416*** -0.464*** -0.307*** 
   (3.25) (3.11) (3.61) (3.80) (3.14) 
lawqual2   -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
    -0.86 0.18 -0.62 -0.64 
bureauqual  -0.313*** -0.309*** -0.315*** -0.311*** -0.312*** 
   (3.05) (2.90) (3.15) (2.97) (3.01) 
bureauqual2   -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 
    (0.60) (0.38) (0.29) (0.22) 
capitalization 0.125*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.114** 0.131*** 
 (9.22) (8.68) (8.72) (8.79) (8.70) (8.82) 
banksize 0.111** 0.101** 0.103** 0.114** 0.104** 0.097** 
 (2.41) (2.20) (2.25) (2.53) (2.25) (2.08) 
public  0.030 0.028 0.036 0.029 0.033 
  (0.84) (0.80) (1.07) (0.82) (1.00) 
foreign  -0.016** -0.015** -0.012** -0.015** -0.019** 
  (2.14) (2.13) (2.00) (2.12) (2.06) 
gdpcapita  -0.025* -0.027* -0.029* -0.026* -0.020* 
  (1.75) (1.78) (1.83) (1.77) (1.79) 
inflation  -0.021** -0.024** -0.033** -0.023** -0.012** 
  (2.07) (2.15) (2.31) (2.13) (1.94) 
Bank obs. 14381 14381 14381 7639 12942 14381 
Country obs. 214 214 214 201 214 214 
Wald (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan (p-value) 0.137 0.168 0.143 0.223 0.150  
AR1 (p-value) 0.083 0.084 0.095 0.112 0.090  
AR2 (p-value) 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.037 0.016  
Note: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of determinants of market power L in 
the EU15 countries. All equations include time effects. Squared variables are included to capture potential 
non-linearity were appropriate. Bank obs. is the number of bank observations in the sample; Country obs. is 
the number of country observations in the sample; Wald is a Wald-statistic for the joint significance of the 
coefficients (found to be significant at the 1% level for all equations). Sargan is the Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 are tests for first and second order autocorrelation, respectively. 
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Lt-1 0.447*** 0.436*** 0.432*** 0.432*** 0.429***  
 (6.25) (6.01) (5.88) (5.90) (5.79)  
FRI 1.900*** 0.942* 0.921** 0.991** 0.924** 0.902** 
  (3.60) (1.80) (2.17) (2.62) (2.22) (1.94) 
FRI2   -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.027*** 
   (3.13) (3.47) (3.20) (3.03) 
corruption  -0.391*** 0.479*** 0.465*** 0.487*** 0.405** 
   (4.53) (3.06) (2.92) (3.23) (2.61) 
corruption2   -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.048*** 
   (5.67) (5.80) (5.74) (5.12) 
lawqual  -0.135 0.264* 0.267** 0.266** 0.231* 
   (0.99) (1.87) (1.90) (1.89) (1.78) 
lawqual2   -0.031*** 0.032*** 0.033 0.027*** 
    (5.29) (5.42) (5.45) (3.52) 
bureauqual  -0.095 0.180** 0.167* 0.176** 0.152* 
   (1.26) (1.95) (1.81) (1.91) (1.83) 
bureauqual2   -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.026*** 
    (3.79) (3.60) (3.76) (2.91) 
capitalization 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.121*** 0.146*** 0.124*** 0.118 
 (7.10) (6.71) (6.07) (7.80) (6.16) (5.70) 
banksize 0.200*** 0.186*** 0.194*** 0.203*** 0.196*** 0.180** 
 (3.12) (2.92) (3.03) (3.30) (3.08) (2.67) 
public  0.172* 0.175** 0.049 0.179** 0.161* 
  (1.85) (1.91) 0.88 (1.96) (1.85) 
foreign  -0.129*** -0.131*** -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.120 
  (7.21) (7.40) (7.69) (7.51) (5.48) 
gdpcapita  0.019 0.020 0.029** 0.023* 0.018 
  (1.64) (1.66) (1.91) (1.76) (1.62) 
inflation  -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.025** -0.036*** -0.029** 
  (3.28) (3.33) (2.21) (3.37) (2.59) 
Bank obs. 8465 8465 8465 2820 7618 8465 
Country obs. 201 201 201 201 201 201 
Wald (p-value) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan (p-value) 0.201 0.248 0.226 0.188 0.217  
AR(1) (p-value) 0.043 0.066 0.070 0.088 0.068  
AR(2) (p-value) 0.010 0.016 0.016 0.030 0.015  
Note: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of determinants of market power L in the 
EU15 countries. All equations include time effects. Squared variables are included to capture potential non-
linearity were appropriate. Bank obs. is the number of bank observations in the sample; Country obs. is the 
number of country observations in the sample; Wald is a Wald-statistic for the joint significance of the 
coefficients (found to be significant at the 1% level for all equations). Sargan is the Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 are tests for first and second order autocorrelation, respectively. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
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